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INTRODUCTION 
 
The maxim “an Englishman‟s home is his castle” has its roots in 
Magna Carta. English land law has developed from a feudal system which 
emphasised the authority of the lord: in times long ago most occupiers of 
land were beholden in some way to their lord for their rights to the land, 
being obliged to give services in return for their landholding, and to 
demonstrate loyalty or fealty to their lord. The lords themselves had 
similar obligations to their lords, and ultimately to the King. Hence, it 
used to be said that all land in England was held directly or indirectly 
from the Crown. 
Magna Carta did not undermine the feudal foundations of landholding 
– that has happened progressively over the years to the point where it now 
no longer has any real significance. However, it did make it clear that the 
rights of the King were not absolute. King John had been compelled by 
his barons to reach the agreement with them which was recorded in the 
first Magna Carta (or, to give it its English title, the Great Charter) signed 
and sealed at Runnymede in 1215. Not only did the King need to heed his 
barons, Magna Carta importantly established the subsequently developed 
principle that no person is above the law and that “No free man shall be ... 
stripped of his rights or possessions ... except by the lawful judgement of 
his equals or by the law of the land.”  It is in congruity with this that it 
was held in Semayne’s case at the start of the seventeenth century that not 
even agents of the Crown may enter a person‟s house without lawful 
authority.
1
 We can trace the maxim that an Englishman‟s home is his 
                                                     

 Robert Pearce, BCL, MA, Hon LLD, FRSA, Professor of Law, University of 
Buckingham Law School.  
1
 See Semayne’s Case (1604) 5 Coke Rep 91.  
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castle back to this case.
2
 Even if an Englishman‟s home did not have a 
motte and bailey, or other fortified defences, it would be protected by the 
force of the law.  
This does not mean that landowners have unfettered and unqualified 
rights to their home. A homeowner is no more above the law than the 
King (or the barons) and must comply with the laws of the land. 
Landowners cannot hide from the process of law for criminal acts 
committed within the boundaries of their property; homeowners have 
legal duties for the safety of visitors (even uninvited visitors); they are 
restricted in how they use or develop the property by planning laws; most 
importantly in this context they may find that their security in their own 
home is compromised if they have used it to secure a loan which they are 
unable to repay. Although the proportion of houses bought for cash has 
increased to over a third in recent years,
3
 the majority of house purchases 
continue to be financed with the aid of a mortgage. Originally mortgages 
worked by a landowner transferring away legal ownership as security for 
the loan, but with a right to recover full ownership on repayment of the 
loan. The surrender of legal ownership made it clear that the castle 
defences had been breached and that the owner was vulnerable if the loan 
was not repaid. The anachronistic means of using a transfer of title as the 
means of granting security for a loan has now been clumsily abolished,
4
 
but the risk of losing the home if the loan is not repaid remains.  As 
secured loan advertisements remind us: 
 
“Your home may be repossessed if you do not keep up repayments 
on your mortgage.”5 
 
EQUITY RELEASE SCHEMES 
 
It is not just when a house is purchased that a mortgage may be taken 
out. Rising house prices have meant that some people are asset rich but 
income poor. It is tempting for a person in this position to seek to access 
                                                     
2
 For a more recent invocation of the maxim, see Malik v Fassenfelt [2013] 
EWCA Civ 798. 
3
 See Hamptons International News Release 27 March 2014: „Buoyant first time 
and cash buying puts pressure on supply.‟ 
4
 See Stevens and Pearce, Land Law (London, 5
th
 ed, Sweet and Maxwell 2013) 
paras 17.13-17.15 and 17.25-17.28. 
5
 This is the warning currently given by mortgage lenders and on comparison 
websites such as Money Super Market: 
http://www.moneysupermarket.com/mortgages/. 
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their capital to improve their standard of living. Alternatively, the equity 
in a house arising from progressively increasing house prices may be seen 
as a source of refinancing debt, or even repaying debt. The North East 
Property Buyers (NEPB) litigation concerns one way in which this could 
be done: through a sale and lease back. This kind of arrangement has been 
common for years in the commercial sector. The owner of property sells it 
to a finance or property management company. This releases some or 
most of the capital value in the property. The purchasing company then 
rents the property back to the seller. In this way the seller retains the use 
of the property, albeit in return for continuing rental payments. Of course, 
if the rent is not paid, then the seller will lose the use of the property. 
 
SALE AND LEASE BACK WITH MORTGAGE 
 
However, as the NEPB litigation demonstrates, a failure by the seller 
to pay rent is not the only risk. If the company purchasing the property has 
taken out a mortgage to finance the acquisition, then the seller may be at 
risk if the buyer fails to make the mortgage repayments. This is exactly 
what happened in the NEPB litigation.  
 
THE NEPB LITIGATION 
 
NEPB operated a scheme under which it bought houses, often from 
people who had run into debt through illness or unemployment, and 
offered them the chance to continue living there, often at a substantially 
discounted rent. It financed the purchases through mortgage loans secured 
on the properties purchasee. NEPB defaulted on the mortgages and the 
lenders, who were unaware of the arrangements with the sellers, sought 
possession of the properties from the sellers in order to sell them and 
redeem the mortgage. Press reports suggested that there could be around 
2,000 people in danger of eviction.
6
 According to Detective Chief 
Inspector Jim McAll, of Northumbria Police: “If proven, and if it is on the 
scale alleged, it will probably be one of the biggest property frauds in the 
country.”7 
                                                     
6
 The Journal (Newcastle upon Tyne) 19 September 2013. 
http://www.thejournal.co.uk/news/north-east-news/police-cuts-could-damage-
north-6062049. 
7
 Northern Echo „Arrests in Darlington, Newton Aycliffe and Barnard Castle‟ 
Tuesday 2 March 2010. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
181 
Were the mortgage companies entitled to evict sellers who had been 
promised a home for life? Nine
8
 cases were selected as test cases, and 
were heard at first instance by Judge Behrens, sitting as a judge of the 
High Court in Leeds.
9
  He decided in favour of the lenders. Some of the 
cases were settled, but others were appealed to the Court of Appeal, which 
again decided in favour of the lenders.
10
 One, involving Mrs Rosemary 
Scott, went to the Supreme Court, which also found in favour of the 
lenders.
11
 
 
MRS SCOTT’S CASE 
 
Although there were some differences between the facts in some of 
the cases, most followed the same pattern, and Mrs Scott‟s case is 
representative of them all. Only the facts of this case are therefore 
described.  
Rosemary Scott and her former husband had bought their house, 23 
Goathland Avenue, Forest Hill, from North Tyneside Borough Council in 
1999 under the government‟s right to buy scheme, which allowed them, as 
secure tenants, to buy at a discount below open market value. They took 
out a mortgage from Cheltenham and Gloucester plc to finance the 
purchase. A few years later the couple divorced and by 2005 Mrs Scott, 
who remained in the house, was in financial difficulties. She owed 
£70,000 on the mortgage.
12
 She advertised the house for sale at £156,000, 
but was unsuccessful at securing a sale close to this price. She was 
indirectly introduced to a Mr Foster, who was connected to NEPB. He 
proposed a deal under which NEPB would pay off her Cheltenham and 
Gloucester mortgage, and give her £24,000 in cash.  She would be 
allowed to remain in the house indefinitely for £250 per month rent. 
NEPB would charge a fee of £40,000 for this arrangement (this was later 
                                                     
8
 Lord Clarke in Scott refers to ten cases [3] but only nine were involved in the 
first instance hearing before Judge Behrens. 
9
 Various Mortgagors v Various Mortgagees [2010] EWHC 2991 (Judge 
Behrens). 
10
 Cook v The Mortgage Business Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 17 (Cook). 
11
 Scott v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd [2014] UKSC 52 (Scott). 
12
 We do not know how much was paid when the property was purchased from 
the Council, but it was almost certainly significantly less than this: an online 
search shows that a similar house next door was purchased for £37,500 in 2002. 
The amount of the mortgage may have been increased after the purchase either to 
pay for improvements or to buy out Mr Scott‟s share of the property. There may 
also have been accrued arrears of interest. 
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directed to be paid to UK Property Buyers). If Mrs Scott remained a 
tenant for ten years, she would be paid a further £15,000 as a loyalty 
bonus. If anything happened to her, she was told, her son Richard would 
be able to take over her rights.
13
 The offer may have seemed like an 
answer to her prayers: she would pay off her mortgage, have lower 
monthly charges, and have cash in hand. 
Mrs Scott agreed to this deal, and so the property was sold in 2005 to 
a Ms Wilkinson (acting as a nominee or agent for NEPB). The sale price 
recorded was £135,000 and completion took place on 12 August. Ms 
Wilkinson obtained a buy-to-let interest-only mortgage for £115,000 from 
Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd
14
 which did not know that Mrs Scott was 
living in the house and that she had been made a promise that she could 
continue living there. It is worth noting in this context that because the 
rights of a person living at the property are often enforceable against a 
buyer as overriding interests, it is the expected normal practice for the 
buyer to inspect the property and to make enquiries of any occupier. If the 
occupier fails to disclose any rights when asked, those rights will normally 
cease to be enforceable; it is also possible for the buyer to obtain a written 
waiver from the occupier. Mortgage companies rarely conduct their own 
enquiries, and rely upon the enquiries made by the buyer and by any 
valuer. That was the case here. This practice offers little protection to a 
mortgage company where the buyer (and perhaps also the valuer) is 
participating in a fraud, or where (as is sometimes the case) the valuer is 
asked for a “drive-by” valuation which does not involve a visit to the 
property.  
On 16 August Mrs Scott was given a letter confirming the terms of the 
sale. She was also granted (by UK Property Buyers acting as agents for 
Ms Wilkinson) a two-year assured shorthold tenancy which stated that at 
the end of the fixed term it would become a monthly periodic tenancy 
terminable on not less than two months‟ notice in writing. This was in 
breach of the mortgage which contained terms under which only tenancies 
of up to a year could be granted. At this stage Mrs Scott did not know that 
the property had been mortgaged. The sale and mortgage were registered 
on 16 September. 
                                                     
13
 See the appendix to Judge Behrens‟ decision which sets out the promises which 
were made to the occupiers in all the test cases. It is not normally possible for a 
tenant under a private tenancy to pass a tenancy on to another family member. 
14
 If this mortgage had borne the relatively low interest rate of 3% the interest 
payments would have been £287 per month. A more likely interest rate of 5% 
would have required monthly interest payments of £479. It will be noted that 
these payments would have substantially exceeded the agreed monthly rent.  
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It was only in August 2008 that Mrs Scott discovered that there might 
be a mortgage on the property when she received a letter from North East 
Property Lettings “suggesting that there had been teething problems 
following an office move and that some tenants had been receiving letters 
from mortgage companies stating that the account was in arrears, which, 
the letter assured Mrs Scott, was incorrect.”15 In 2009, six months later, 
Mrs Scott accidentally opened a letter addressed to Ms Wilkinson at the 
house. She learnt from this that, without her knowledge, a possession 
order had been made on March 17, 2009. She subsequently received a 
warrant for possession due to be executed on May 20, 2009. This warrant 
was suspended while Mrs Scott argued her case. 
 
BUY-TO-LET FRAUD 
 
Although fraud was not proved in this case, the circumstances pointed 
very strongly to the arrangement being a scam from the outset, and 
criminal charges were pending at the date of the trial.
16
 The arrangements 
involved a complex web of parties, including NEPB (of which Lord 
Neuberger in the Court of Appeal said, “It is unclear what NEPB is or 
comprises.”),17 UK Property Buyers, North East Property Lettings, and a 
number of other individuals including Michael Foster and Amee 
Wilkinson. There had been some unusual omissions or entries in the 
mortgage application forms and contract documentation and no visit to the 
property had been made by the mortgage company. The solicitors 
advising Mrs Scott or other victims had not all acted professionally, and 
may have been dishonest, and some of the solicitors in this or similar 
cases were subject to disciplinary proceedings.
18
 It is very hard to see how 
the arrangement could have made any commercial sense to NEPB if it had 
operated as intended.  
 
MRS SCOTT’S ARGUMENT 
 
The argument for Mrs Scott was relatively straightforward. She was at 
all material times living in the house. The proprietary rights of an occupier 
are normally overriding interests binding a buyer even if those rights have 
not been protected by an entry on the register at the Land Registry, 
                                                     
15
 Scott [22]. 
16
 At the time of writing this article the trials, which were expected to last several 
months, were in progress but were subject to reporting restrictions. 
17
 Cook [8]. 
18
 Scott [3] and [24]. 
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provided that the rights have not been surrendered or waived as part of the 
sale. Mrs Scott therefore argued that her rights to the house were 
overriding interests: she was living in the house when it was sold, and any 
person acquiring a right in the house did so subject to whatever rights she 
had.
19
 She could not claim a right to the freehold (since she had agreed to 
sell it). However, her main argument went, the promise to allow her to 
remain living in the house for the rest of her life gave her a proprietary 
interest in the home, and since this was in existence when the mortgage 
was executed or registered, her interest bound Southern Pacific, the 
mortgage company.
20
  
 
MRS SCOTT LOSES HER CASE 
 
The Supreme Court considered that Mrs Scott‟s case was not made 
out. Under the Land Registration Act 2002 section 29 the registration of a 
mortgage gives it priority over all earlier rights except either those 
recorded on the register or those which constitute overriding interests.
 21
  
Only proprietary rights can be overriding interests, and to be protected as 
an overriding interest the proprietary right must be in existence when the 
mortgage is created. In the view of the Supreme Court, before the sale 
took place neither NEPB nor its agents had any power to grant a 
proprietary right to Mrs Scott. Until the date of the sale, she therefore had 
no proprietary right based on their promises to her. Applying Abbey 
National Building Society v Cann
22
 the sale and mortgage should be 
treated as taking effect at the same instant, and therefore it could not be 
said that her rights came into existence before the mortgage. It followed 
that the mortgage took priority over the promises to Mrs Scott and the 
lease in her favour. The mortgage company was accordingly entitled to 
the order for possession. 
 
                                                     
19
 See Land Registration Act 2002, s 29 and Schedule 3. 
20
 If Mrs Scott could claim only a tenancy (a recognised proprietary interest), her 
rights could be terminated by notice bringing the tenancy to an end. She therefore 
needed to claim that her rights included the promise that she would be secure in 
the home so long as she paid the agreed rent. 
21
 The ordinary rule is that rights take effect in the order in which they are 
created. The effect of s 29 is that certain rights (such as a registered transfer of 
ownership or a registered mortgage) operate like a trump card to give precedence 
over certain (unprotected) earlier rights. 
22
 Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1991] 1 AC 56 (Cann). 
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ABBEY NATIONAL BS V CANN 
 
At one level the Scott case is a straightforward application of the 
principles set out in the Cann case. That, however, was a very different 
case from Scott. Mrs Cann had helped to pay for a house, 7 Hillview, 
which was being acquired by her son, George, for them both to live in. 
She knew that he was taking out a mortgage to finance the purchase, but 
when he failed to keep up the mortgage payments she claimed that she 
could not be evicted because she had an overriding interest based on her 
occupation of the property. It was accepted that her financial contribution 
was sufficient to give her a proprietary interest.
23
 The House of Lords, 
however, rejected her argument that she was already living in the house 
when the registered mortgage was made. Although she was in occupation 
when the mortgage was registered, the House of Lords considered that she 
needed to be in actual occupation before the mortgage was created, which 
was when the purchase was completed.
24
 Mrs Cann was not at that point 
living in the house, and it was not enough that she had started to move her 
belongings in a few hours before completion. In any event, her proprietary 
interest could only arise when her son had sufficient title to the house, and 
that did not happen until completion. However, since in the view of the 
House of Lords the mortgage took effect at the very same moment that he 
acquired title, there was no period before the mortgage was created that he 
could have given her the rights she claimed.
25
 In any event, Mrs Cann 
knew that the purchase was to be subject to a mortgage, and impliedly 
authorised or consented to it. 
Mrs Scott, unlike Mrs Cann, had no knowledge of the mortgage to 
Southern Pacific and could not be said to have authorised it or to have 
agreed to it. Equally, it was indisputable that she was in actual occupation 
                                                     
23
 On the basis of proprietary estoppel, given an assurance by George that she 
would always have a roof over her head. The same conclusion would probably 
now be reached on the basis of constructive trust: see Jones v Kernott [2011] 
UKSC 53 and Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17. 
24
 Lord Collins (Scott [47]) suggests that this part of the decision is confirmed by 
Land Registration Act 2002, Schedule 3, paragraph 2 which refers to „the time of 
the disposition.‟ With respect the language of the Act does not lead inexorably to 
this conclusion, since the Act also states that a disposition does not operate at law 
until it has been registered. A different view would, however, be inconvenient. 
25
 The House of Lords rejected the argument that there was a momentary fraction 
of time between George acquiring ownership and the mortgage taking effect. It 
had been argued that this „scintilla temporis‟ allowed Mrs Cann‟s rights to arise 
(or to be „fed‟) before the mortgage took effect. 
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at the relevant date, whatever it was, since she was in actual occupation 
throughout. 
 
AN INTEREST CREATED BEFORE COMPLETION? 
 
It was argued for Mrs Scott that she had an interest in 23 Goathland 
Avenue even before completion. It was said that the contract for sale in 
favour of Amee Wilkinson, on behalf of NEPB, gave her a sufficient 
interest in the house to enable her to grant rights to Mrs Scott. There is 
long authority that as from the date of exchange of contracts for the sale of 
land, the seller holds on constructive trust for the buyer.
26
 If this gives the 
buyer an equitable interest,
27
 then surely this should be sufficient to enable 
to buyer to make commitments which bind the land, subject to any 
registration requirements. In response to this, Lord Collins pointed out 
that the constructive trust was of a distinctive kind, and after a careful 
review of the authorities (a number of which had been concerned with the 
purported grant of leases by a buyer prior to completion), came to the 
conclusion that prior to acquiring the legal estate the buyer could create 
nothing more than personally enforceable contractual rights.
28
 Mrs Scott 
therefore had no proprietary interest capable of binding Southern Pacific. 
A subsidiary argument based on the notion that Mrs Scott made only a 
partial grant to Ms Wilkinson since she reserved rights for herself was 
rejected because the court viewed the transaction as a sale and leaseback 
rather than a grant of only the reversion on the lease.
29
 
 
THE INDIVISIBILITY OF THE CONTRACT 
 
In the view of Lord Collins, with whom Lord Sumption agreed, even 
if equitable rights could arise between contract and conveyance, the logic 
                                                     
26
 Lloyds Bank plc v Carrick [1996] 4 All ER 630; Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 
Ch D 499. In Ireland the existence of this trust has been confirmed by the Land 
and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 s 52 resolving a doubt created by the 
Irish Supreme Court decision in Tempany v Hynes [1976] IR 101. See Pearce and 
Mee Land Law (3
rd
 ed, Round Hall Press, Dublin 2011)133-135. 
27
 In Gordon Hill Trust Ltd v Segall [1941] 2 All ER 379 the Court of Appeal 
thought that a contract of sale was sufficient to enable the purchaser to describe 
himself as the „owner‟ in a contract to sell the property on prior to completion. 
28
 Lady Hale agreed with this, so the Supreme Court was unanimous on this 
point. 
29
 Scott [77]-[78]. Another argument, that Mrs Scott‟s rights were akin to an 
unpaid vendor‟s lien, was also rejected. Ibid [76]. 
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of Cann, supported by other authorities, was that in relation to priorities, 
the contract could not be treated as distinct for legal purposes from 
completion: 
 
“The contract of sale does, of course, have separate legal effects, 
but it would be wholly unrealistic to treat the contract for present 
purposes as a divisible element in this process.”30 
 
Lady Hale and Lords Wilson and Reed disagreed with this rather 
startling conclusion. It might hold true in a case
31
 where contract, 
mortgage and completion were all completed on the same day, it could not 
be treated as “a general proposition applicable to all ordinary domestic 
conveyancing transactions.”32 
 
KEY ISSUES  
 
There were two crucial findings in Scott. The first was that a buyer 
could not, before completion, create any equitable rights capable of 
binding the land. This was implicit in Cann. The second, directly adopted 
from Cann, was that completion was indivisible: the purchase and the 
mortgage were so interconnected that both took effect at the very same 
moment; each was subject to the other, and neither had priority.
33
 We 
should not doubt for a moment that these are policy decisions rather than 
decisions driven by ineluctable logic. 
Most of the legal debate in Cann centred on four cases in the early 
1950s dealing with whether a lease granted by a buyer after contract but 
before completion was binding on a mortgagee which had helped to 
finance the purchase. In the following discussion these are called “the four 
cases.”34 
 
                                                     
30
 Scott [87]. 
31
 Such as Nationwide Anglia Building Society v Ahmed and Balakrishnan (1995) 
70 P & CR 381. 
32
 Scott [120] - [121] and [123]. 
33
 See Scott [48]. 
34
 The cases are Coventry Permanent Economic Building Society v Jones [1951] 1 
All ER 901 (Jones); Universal Permanent Building Society v Cooke [1952] Ch 95 
(CA) (Cooke); Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Marshall [1952] Ch 1 
(Marshall) and Church of England Building Society v Piskor [1954] Ch 553 (CA) 
(Piskor). 
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Creation of rights prior to completion 
 
In regard to the inability to create proprietary rights prior to 
completion, it does not follow that because, prior to completion, it is 
impossible for a buyer to create a legal right out of a legal estate he does 
not have, that it is impossible for him to create an equitable right. It is 
clear beyond peradventure that a person with an equitable interest under a 
trust has the power to deal with it. This is explicitly recognised in the Law 
of Property Act 1925.
35
 A person with only an equitable interest in land is 
able to create a valid charge, as has been recognised where one of two co-
owners purports to create a legal charge by forging the signature of the 
other co-owner. The charge takes effect as an equitable charge binding the 
share of the person who executed it.
36
 If a contract for sale confers an 
equitable interest on the purchaser, and there is substantial authority that it 
does (even though the constructive trust is an unusual one
37
), there is no 
reason in principle why the equitable owner cannot carve rights out of it.
38
 
In Jones, the first of the four cases,
39
 Harman J, a very distinguished 
Chancery judge, thought that a lease entered into by a buyer prior to 
completion created an effective equitable lease.
40
 Lord Collins says in 
Scott that in Jones “the tenants only had personal rights against the 
purchaser” but he omits to mention that this was because Harman J held 
that the equitable lease, being based on a contract to grant a legal lease, 
constituted an estate contract, and as such (the property concerned being 
unregistered land) it was registrable as a Class C(iv)land charge under the 
Land Charges Act 1925; the failure to register it meant that it was void as 
against a purchaser for money or money‟s worth.41  
                                                     
35
 Section 53(1) (c). See Pearce and Stevens, Trusts and Equitable Obligations 
(6
th
 ed, Oxford University Press 2015) 198-209. 
36
 Thames Guaranty Ltd v Campbell [1985] QB 210 and Mortgage Corporation v 
Shaire [2000] EWHC Ch 452. See Stevens and Pearce (n 4) para 17.33. 
37
 Lloyds Bank plc v Carrick [1996] 4 All ER 630 at 637G where Morritt LJ 
described it as a trusteeship „of a peculiar kind.‟ 
38
 See Gordon Hill Trust Ltd v Segall [1941] 2 All ER 379. 
39
 Coventry Permanent Economic Building Society v Jones [1951] 1 All ER 901, 
903. 
40
 This is a straightforward application of the rule in Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 21 
Ch D 9. 
41
 Coventry Permanent Economic Building Society v Jones [1951] 1 All ER 901, 
903-904. 
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Only one other of the four cases picks up the question of whether a 
buyer can create an equitable lease before completion. This is Cooke.
42
 
The trial judge had held that an orally created lease made by a buyer prior 
to completion was binding on the building society which had helped to 
finance the purchase, and he considered that the lease did not require 
registration under the Land Charges Act. The tenant succeeded on appeal 
on a different point, but Jenkins LJ pointed out that the trial judge was 
wrong on the issue of registration because the Land Charges Act did not 
confine the need to register estate contracts to those made in writing.
43
 By 
making this point he appears to confirm the view, argued by counsel, that 
the lease took effect in equity prior to completion. Evershed MR, in 
rebutting the argument that the lease could not be treated as a tenancy by 
estoppel capable of being enlarged into a legal lease once the buyer 
received the legal estate, pointed out that the buyer could not confer the 
privilege of possession on the purported tenant because, prior to 
completion, she had herself no right to possession.
44
 This remark should 
be considered in its context and it need not be interpreted as an obstacle in 
a case like Scott where Mrs Scott was already lawfully in possession and 
the grant of an equitable lease would simply confirm that she had a 
continuing right to possession. Moreover, the difficulty identified by Sir 
Raymond Evershed would not apply to other types of equitable grant, 
such as a constructive trust based on a financial contribution or a buyer 
entering into a sub-contract to sell the land.
45
  
 
The indivisibility of completion 
 
The four cases all dealt with the question of whether the completion of 
a purchase and the completion of a mortgage used to finance it were 
indivisible. The mortgage and the formal deed of transfer are separate 
documents which are separately executed and separately registered. The 
                                                     
42
 Universal Permanent Building Society v Cooke [1952] Ch 95 (CA). 
43
 Cooke [1952] Ch 95,104. 
44
 Cooke [1952] Ch 95,103. The same proposition was made by Judge Behrens: 
Various Mortgagors v Various Mortgagees [2010] EWHC 2991 [54]. 
45
 It is not uncommon for a buyer, particularly of commercial property, to enter 
into a contract prior to completion to sell the property being purchased to a new 
buyer (see Gordon Hill Trust Ltd v Segall [1941] 2 All ER 379). Such sub-
purchasers in the past have been able to protect their rights by the registration of a 
notice on the registered title. If Scott is correct in holding that a buyer can create 
only personal rights prior to completion, such a sub-contract can create personal 
rights only and therefore cannot be protected by the registration of a notice. 
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main argument for indivisibility is that, despite these elements of 
separation, the two transactions are so closely interlinked and 
interdependent that they should be treated as if they were a single 
operation.
46
 The main argument against indivisibility is that it is only once 
the buyer has acquired title that it is possible to grant a mortgage. Jones
47
 
was the only one of these cases to conclude that the two transactions were 
indivisible, and that there was therefore no moment at which the buyer of 
a property subject to a mortgage acquired a legal title free from the 
mortgage. In Marshall
48
 Danckwerts J held that the mortgagee could not 
rely on this argument because the mortgage deed explicitly acknowledged 
that the mortgagor had title to the estate. In Cooke
49
 the Court of Appeal 
took the same view because the dates of the relevant deeds disclosed that 
the purchase had been completed a day before the mortgage was signed. 
In Piskor
50
 the Court of Appeal went further and held that, as a matter of 
general principle, there would always be a gap (a “scintilla temporis”) 
between the completion of the purchase and the grant of the mortgage.  
In Cann in the House of Lords there was some discussion of the 
process by which mortgage advances are agreed and implemented – 
inevitably where a purchase is subject to a mortgage the borrower will 
have agreed the mortgage some time before completion, or even 
frequently before exchange of contracts. In the end the conclusion was 
that the purchase and the mortgage should be treated as taking effect 
simultaneously, because they were so interdependent. The House of Lords 
in Cann considered that Piskor and Marshall were wrongly decided,
51
 the 
former because it flew in the face of reality to suggest that a purchase 
which was dependent upon a mortgage could be treated as divisible from 
it, the latter because it placed too much emphasis upon the recitals in a 
deed.
52
  
                                                     
46
 Even if electronic conveyancing is introduced, eliminating the gap between the 
execution of a transaction and its registration, the question whether a mortgage 
and transfer are indivisible remains since the two transactions would still involve 
different parties and would still not form part of a single operation (unless the 
system is programmed in a way which produces this effect).  
47
 Coventry Permanent Economic Building Society v Jones [1951] 1 All ER 901. 
48
 Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Marshall [1952] Ch 1. 
49
 Cooke [1952] Ch 95. 
50
 Church of England Building Society v Piskor [1954] Ch 553 (CA). 
51
 Cann [1990] UKHL 3, 18 and 27-28. 
52
 Lady Hale in Scott [110] notes that the separation of the dates of completion 
and mortgage in Cooke mean that the case may have been correctly decided if the 
sale and mortgage were not interdependent.  
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It is very true that George Cann could not have bought 7 Hillview 
without the aid of the mortgage loan. To that extent the mortgage and the 
purchase were inextricably linked. But equally, he could not have bought 
7 Hillview without the financial contribution from his mother.
53
 Why 
could it not be said that her rights arose at the very same moment as the 
completion of the sale and the mortgage? Lord Collins in Scott identified 
statements of Lord Oliver and Lord Jauncey in Cann which suggested that 
Mrs Cann had no rights to 7 Hillview prior to completion because until 
then George had no power to grant them, but those observations would 
have applied equally to George‟s power to create a mortgage in favour of 
the Abbey National. If the Building Society‟s rights came into operation at 
the very instant of completion, why does the same logic not apply to the 
rights of Mrs Cann?
54
 
Similarly in Scott, even if the purchase and the mortgage were 
inextricably linked (despite Mrs Scott not knowing that the purchase 
would be financed by a mortgage, the purchase and the promise to Mrs 
Scott were also inextricably linked. The reality of the situation is that the 
transfer to Amee Wilkinson on behalf of NEPB would not have taken 
place were it not for the promises that had been made to Mrs Scott. If the 
purchase of 23 Goathland Avenue was subject from the instant of 
completion to a mortgage to Southern Pacific, could it not also be treated 
as subject from the same instant to the right of Mrs Scott to live there for 
as long as she wanted at the discounted rent? Instead, and rather 
illogically, the Supreme Court appears to treat the finding that the 
mortgage and completion are simultaneous as meaning inevitably that Mrs 
Scott‟s rights must have come into existence only after the mortgage. 
Finding that the rights of Mrs Cann or Mrs Scott arose at the same 
instant as the mortgage would give rise to an interesting question of 
priority. The normal rule is that priority is governed by the order of 
creation of rights.
55
 The registration of a charge or mortgage gives it 
                                                     
53
 A contribution which arose from the sale of the house in which they were 
previously living. 
54
 The objection that the purchaser cannot grant rights binding the estate until 
registration applies equally to the mortgage. Lady Hale recognises that, 
notwithstanding that legal title has not vested in the purchaser; the purchaser‟s 
position is different after completion: Scott [113]. 
55
 This is the normal rule for equitable rights and is confirmed by the Land 
Registration Act 2002 s 28 which states that „the priority of an interest affecting a 
registered estate or charge is not affected by a disposition of the estate or charge.‟ 
There are special rules which apply to registered charges, if there is more than 
one (s 48), but these are not relevant in this context.  
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priority over “any interest affecting the estate immediately before the 
disposition whose priority is not protected” as an overriding interest or by 
virtue of an entry on the register.
56
 If the rights of Mrs Cann or of Mrs 
Scott only came into existence at the same instant as the sale and 
mortgage took effect, then none of these three interests would have come 
into existence before the other, not even momentarily. The impact of this 
on priorities will be considered later. 
 
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT  
 
Was the Supreme Court wrong? 
 
The conclusion in Cann and Scott that the coincidence of the transfer 
of title and the mortgage means that the rights of the occupier in each case 
can have arisen only after the creation of the mortgage is therefore not a 
logical conclusion, but a policy decision that the mortgage should have 
priority. That does not mean that the decision is wrong. There are some 
good arguments why mortgages should have priority in a situation like 
this. Lord Collins said that “there is ... an important public interest in the 
security of registered transactions.”57 Nearly two thirds of all house 
purchases are financed with the aid of a mortgage. If mortgage lending 
were made more difficult or risky, it might make mortgages harder to 
obtain or more expensive. On the other hand, the Supreme Court said in 
Scott that “the court‟s duty is to apply the law irrespective of an 
unexpected impact on conveyancing practice and an adverse effect on the 
risks of secured lending.”58  
 
Lady Hale’s Reservations 
 
Baroness Hale reluctantly agreed with the decision on the grounds that 
Ms Wilkinson could not grant anything other than personal rights on Mrs 
Scott up until the date of completion. She had, however, some concern 
about the harshness of the result.  Having earlier
59
 noted that the court had 
been asked “to distinguish Cann but not to bury it,” she confessed to 
uneasiness with confirming the decision. 
  
                                                     
56
 Land Registration Act 2002 s 29. 
57
 Scott [25]. 
58
 Scott [88]. 
59
 Scott [114]. 
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“First, Cann was not a case in which the vendor had been deceived 
in any way or been made promises which the purchaser could not 
keep. Should there not come a point when a vendor who has been 
tricked out of her property can assert her rights even against a 
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee? Second, Cann was not a case 
in which the lenders could be accused of acting irresponsibly in 
any way. Should there not come a point when the claims of 
lenders who have failed to heed the obvious warning signs that 
would have told them that this borrower was not a good risk are 
postponed to those of vendors who have been made promises that 
the borrowers cannot keep? Innocence is a comparative concept. 
There ought to be some middle way between the “all or nothing” 
approach of the present law.” 60  
 
She welcomed the fact that the Law Commission had announced that 
it intended to review the Land Registration Act 2002 including the impact 
of fraud. 
 
Were Lady Hale’s Reservations justified? 
 
Baroness Hale was right to have reservations. Although there was no 
explicit finding of fraud in the case, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
Mrs Scott was made promises that could not be kept. She may have 
exercised a lack of caution about the arrangement, but she was short of 
money and used apparently reputable solicitors,
61
 although they were 
chosen and paid for by NEPB. She must have signed the contract for sale 
which Lord Collins said provided that the sale would be with vacant 
possession
62
 although the alternative provision in the conditions of sale 
stating that the sale was subject to specified tenancies had neither been 
deleted nor completed.
63
 She should also have seen the requisitions on 
title which said that arrangements should be made with her about the time 
at which vacant possession would be given and for arrangements for 
handing over the keys.
64
 But if there was a degree of fault on her part, 
Southern Pacific could not avoid all responsibility. The failure to 
complete or delete the alternatives in the contract should have been 
                                                     
60
 Scott [122]. 
61
 The author confesses to a personal interest. The firm acting for Mrs Scott also 
acted as his solicitors for his first house purchase. 
62
 Scott [78]. 
63
 Scott [19]. 
64
 Scott [18]. 
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noticed by them or their solicitors; even though this was a buy-to-let 
mortgage, neither they nor their agent visited the property, nor was Mrs 
Scott asked if she had any continuing rights. In this respect Southern 
Pacific relied on the honesty and candour of the purchaser. The solicitors 
acting for Mrs Scott also informed Southern Pacific‟s solicitors that the 
lenders needed to be informed that part of the proceeds of the sale were 
being paid to UK Property Buyers, which indicated that this was not a 
normal outright sale.
65
 
Baroness Hale may have been overstating her concern that an 
irresponsible lender could never be affected by the right of a vendor who 
was duped into selling by having been given unenforceable promises. 
There are equitable doctrines which may enable some lenders to be bound. 
On the principle that “fraud unravels all”, a mortgagee who knowingly 
participates in a fraud will not be able to rely on the mortgage security.
66
 
The equitable wrong of knowing receipt of trust property in breach of trust 
applies to misappropriated property, and the Supreme Court has suggested 
that it will operate where a bank receiving the proceeds of a dishonest 
dealing should have been aware from the circumstances that the 
transaction served no commercial purpose.
67
 Judge Behrens at first 
instance
68
 correctly thought that the equitable doctrine of notice had no 
application in registered land
69
 and so rejected the possibility that the 
mortgagee‟s priority could be affected by notice of an adverse right. There 
was no appeal against that finding, which the Court of Appeal thought 
meant that Mrs Scott was precluded from making the argument that the 
mortgagees were estopped from enforcing their security if it was 
established that they had knowledge or notice of the promises made to 
                                                     
65
 Scott [91]. 
66
 See Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 WLR 318 (mortgage used as a device to avoid 
Rent Acts protection); Pearce, [1979] CLJ 257. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that in Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green [1981] AC 513 the House 
of Lords held that relying on one‟s legal rights to defeat the rights of another does 
not, in itself, constitute fraud. There would therefore need to be something more 
than knowledge of an adverse right to constitute fraud. 
67
 Credit Agricole Corporation and Investment Bank v Papadimitriou [2015] 2 
All ER 974 [33]. 
68
 Judge Behrens [2010] EWHC 2991. 
69
 Judge Behrens [64] applying a statement of Lord Wilberforce in Barclays Bank 
v Boland [1981] AC 487 at 584. See also the Law Commission‟s criticism of 
Peffer v Rigg [1978] 3 AER 745 Law Com No. 158 (1987) para 4.15. 
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Mrs Scott.
70
 With respect there is a significant difference between this and 
knowledge or notice of the impropriety of a transaction. 
 
EQUAL PRIORITIES 
 
Is it possible to have equal priorities? 
 
The idea that priorities can be equal is a novel concept in land law. 
Judge Behrens at first instance thought that this was not possible. In his 
view “There cannot in law be a „dead heat‟ between two mutually 
inconsistent and competing interests over a legal estate in land. There 
must be a priority as between them.”71 However, a dead heat indeed 
appears to be the outcome of the conclusion that rights which a purchaser 
purports to create between contract and completion can only take effect at 
the moment of completion. The House of Lords in Cann concluded that 
this meant that the mortgage had priority, but it has already argued that 
there is no a priori reason why it should have been given this preference. 
To explore this further, consider this scenario. If P buys a house with 
money stolen from B, B can assert a claim to an equitable interest in or 
charge over the house. This claim cannot take effect prior to completion, 
because of the rule derived from Scott and Cann that a purchaser cannot 
create rights binding an estate prior to completion and also because until 
that stage none of the money has been invested in the purchase. The 
equitable interest or charge will arise at the moment of completion. But 
suppose that the purchase is also supported by money raised on mortgage. 
The mortgagee‟s claim to the property also arises at the moment of 
completion. Apart from the effect of registering the charge, it is hard to 
see how the priorities could be anything other than equal. Registering the 
charge, however, makes no difference to priorities, because registering a 
charge only confers priority over unprotected rights affecting the estate 
“immediately before the disposition.”72 It would require a stretch of 
purposive interpretation to interpret that phrase as describing rights which 
came into existence only at the same time. In consequence, there would be 
two rights with equal priority. The same consequence would arise if a 
dishonest purchaser funds a purchase with money stolen from two or more 
sources.
73
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 Cook [2012] EWCA Civ 17 [66]. 
71
 Judge Behrens [2010] EWHC 2991 [52]. 
72
 Land Registration Act 2002 s 29. 
73
 The financial advantage to the fraudster in this situation could arise either 
through collusion with the vendor or because the purchase is from another entity 
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Priorities involving registrable dispositions 
 
There are a number of ways in which potentially equal priorities can 
be addressed. It is often assumed that where a priority issue arises 
between interests that require registration as registrable dispositions, the 
normal order of priority is the order in which they are registered.
74
 That 
order will normally follow the date and time of receipt of the registrable 
disposition (subject to any priority notice), but where applications are 
deemed to have been received at the same time
75
 the order of priority is as 
the parties agree,
76
 with the Land Registrar having tie-breaking power. 
However, “Where one transaction is dependent upon another the registrar 
must assume (unless the contrary appears) that the applicants have 
specified that the applications will have priority so as to give effect to the 
sequence of the documents effecting the transactions.”77  Since the 
creation of a mortgage is dependent upon the grantor having an estate 
which can be charged, this would appear potentially to be at odds with the 
ruling in Cann and Scott, although of course that ruling was based on both 
purchase and mortgage being mutually interdependent, a situation not 
envisaged in this clause. 
 
Priorities involving dispositions which are not both registrable 
 
Where a question of priorities arises between rights which are not both 
registrable dispositions, two equitable maxims may be relevant. The first 
is that where equities are equal, the first in time prevails. That will be of 
no assistance where the priorities issue arises because the rights arise at 
the same moment. The second is that where equities are equal, the law 
prevails. That would confirm the outcome in Cann and Scott provided that 
                                                                                                                        
under the control of the fraudster: compare Target Holdings v Redferns [1995] 
UKHL 10. 
74
 This is in part because the priority rule in Land Registration Act 2002 s 29 
gives registered dispositions priority over earlier unprotected interests. In relation 
to mortgages the rule used to be that the date of registration (not of creation) 
governed priority between mortgages (Land Registration Act 1925 s 29). The 
2002 Act is less explicit, but the Land Registration Act 2002 s 48 and Land 
Registration Rules 2003 rule 102 in combination have the same effect.  
75
 Under Land Registration Rules 2003 rule 15 this can happen where there is a 
delay in recording the time of receipt. 
76
 Land Registration Rules 2003 rule 55. 
77
 Land Registration Rules 2003 rule 55(7). 
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the equities are, indeed, equal. However, where the equities are not equal, 
for instance, borrowing Lady Hale‟s observation, because the parties are 
not equally innocent, a different outcome would be justified, and the court 
can give the more innocent party priority. 
In addition, it should not be overlooked that there can be situations 
where the courts have to resolve equal priorities. Where a trustee has 
misappropriated and mixed funds from two different sources, for instance 
where the author of a Ponzi scheme has taken investments from a range of 
different individuals and put them in a common fund, the preferred 
judicial solution is that the defrauded individuals should share the fund 
proportionately to their contribution to it.
78
 It may be objected that the 
principle of share and share alike can apply only to financial 
contributions, and so could have no application to a situation like Scott, 
where Mrs Scott‟s claim was primarily to a right to live in the house for a 
discounted rent.
79
 However, rights of residence are capable of actuarial 
valuation,
80
 and where the interest claimed arises from an estoppel equity, 
the courts have long asserted a right to assess appropriate compensation 
rather than conferring a right in specie.
81
 Finally, there appears to be no 
reason in principle why the courts should not be able to use principles of 
equitable accounting to resolve competing rights having equal priority. 
They have long done so in unravelling the affairs of co-owners whose 
relationship has broken down.
82
 
 
THE IMPACT ON THE PARTIES 
 
Mrs Scott 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Scott left Mrs Scott at risk of 
losing her home of many years. However, her financial loss may not have 
been as great as might at first sight appear. She had put her house on the 
market for £156,000 and, if the promises from NEPB on the sale were not 
enforceable, received just £94,000 for it. That may make it seem that she 
could have lost as much as £62,000 compared with the open market value 
                                                     
78
 See Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22. See the 
discussion in Pearce and Stevens, Trusts and Equitable Obligations (6
th
 ed, OUP 
2015) 978-983. 
79
 She had also been promised a further payment of £15,000 after ten years. 
80
 See Bracken v Byrne [2006] ILRM 91. 
81
 Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG 1115. See the discussion in Stevens 
and Pearce (n 4) 734-746. 
82
 Stevens and Pearce (n 4) 411-420. 
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of her house. However, most or all of the houses in Goathland Avenue 
were former council houses built at the same time and to a similar 
specification, and none has ever sold for anything close to the price which 
Mrs Scott was asking. According to Land Registry data, the immediately 
neighbouring property on one side (number 21) sold for £130,000 in 2009 
and the immediate next door property on the other side (number 25) sold 
for £112,000 in 2014. Even the price of £135,000 for which the Land 
Registry records Mrs Scott‟s sale as having taken place in 2005 may have 
been high
83
 unless 23 Goathland Avenue was a particularly attractive 
property compared with its neighbours.
84
 A better estimate of the extent to 
which Mrs Scott personally received less than full open market value is 
therefore that it was probably less than the £40,000 which NEPB had 
identified as its “cut”. If the property was being sold on the open market 
subject to Mrs Scott‟s right to remain at a rent of £250 per month, then 
this would have reduced the market value of the house subject to her 
tenancy by around 25% or more, and might not have been enough even to 
redeem her mortgage. A more cautious person than Mrs Scott might have 
realised that the deal was too good to be true. 
Mrs Scott knew when she struck her deal with Mr Foster that she 
would cease to own her own home. However, she did expect to be able to 
stay on as a tenant for £250 per month, and that represented a substantial 
benefit compared with normal market rents, which at usual rates of return 
on rental properties
85
 is likely to have been in the order of £500 to £650 
per calendar month. Mrs Scott gained some benefit from that discounted 
rent since at least three and a half years elapsed before she was served 
with the order for possession. That represents a saving of around £11,000 
in rent.  
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 Since NEPB was „retaining‟ £40,000 of this price, the real sale price was 
£95,000. The price may have been inflated in order to enable a higher mortgage 
loan to be obtained. See the Law Society description of Equity Release Fraud in 
its Practice Note on Mortgage Fraud para 2.4.1 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/practice-notes/mortgage-
fraud/ accessed June 2015. 
84
 Rightmove data suggests that average house prices in the NE12 area rose by 
about 10% from 2005 to 2008, with relatively little movement over the period 
2006-2014, apart from a modest peak in 2008. See 
http://www.rightmove.co.uk/house-prices-in-my-
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12+8ha&sellersPriceGuide=Start+Search accessed June 2015. 
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North East Property Buyers 
 
NEPB appears to have set up this kind of arrangement for at least 100 
properties, and possibly very considerably more. It might seem that NEPB 
stood to benefit by £40,000 on 23 Goathland Avenue – the fee that it was 
claiming for the deal – but its actual “turn” is likely to have been far less 
than this because the sale price of £135,000 was never paid. Ms 
Wilkinson, on NEPB‟s behalf, took out a mortgage of £115,000 (£113,000 
after fees), which is the only money that NEPB ever received on this 
property. Out of this it discharged Mrs Scott‟s mortgage and paid her 
£24,000. This left a balance of £19,000 less expenses, plus any rent which 
Mrs Scott paid. Against this, it incurred mortgage interest charges (which 
cannot have been paid in full) which would have amounted over three and 
a half years to about £15,000 to £20,000, exceeding the rent which Mrs 
Scott paid, and wiping out a significant proportion of the capital it 
received. Furthermore, if NEPB met the terms of its bargain, it would not 
be able to sell the property with vacant possession while Mrs Scott or her 
son wished to live in the house, and it also had a liability to pay her a 
further £15,000 after ten years. It could only make a profit from this 
arrangement if it was fraudulent and it did not meet its obligations. 
 
Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd 
 
Southern Pacific lent Ms Wilkinson £115,000. If the property was 
genuinely worth £135,000 at the time of the mortgage, it had good 
security for the loan, but there is a strong possibility that the price of the 
property was inflated in order to enable NEPB to obtain a higher loan than 
would otherwise have been the case. By the time of trial, it is likely that 
the mortgage debt would have increased greatly in consequence of 
accumulated arrears of interest and legal fees. Southern Pacific would 
therefore be unlikely to repay the debt in full even from a sale of the 
property with vacant possession. The Supreme Court did ask the 
mortgagee to show mercy. Lord Collins said „I express the hope that the 
lenders will, before finally enforcing their security, consider whether they 
are able to mitigate any hardship which may be caused to the vendors.‟86 
As at June 2015 (eight months after the judgment) there was no indication 
from publicly available records that 23 Goathland Avenue had been sold 
or was actively being marketed for sale. There is therefore a strong 
possibility that Southern Pacific have agreed to defer enforcing their 
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 Scott [94]. 
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security on terms that Mrs Scott makes periodical payments towards 
mortgage interest.  
 
What might have happened if there was full disclosure? 
 
Southern Pacific would not have agreed to a mortgage based on full 
open market value if it knew that it was purchasing a property which was 
subject to a tenancy at a discounted rent, since this would significantly 
have depressed the value of the property. They were prepared to lend on a 
buy to let basis, but the mortgage terms envisaged that Ms Wilkinson 
could grant only assured shorthold tenancies with a maximum duration of 
six months before becoming period tenancies determinable on two 
months‟ notice. A tenancy of this duration would not have given Mrs 
Scott the rights she was expecting. The lease which was actually granted 
to Mrs Scott was for a fixed two year term, thereafter determinable by two 
months notice. Even if this had been binding on Southern Pacific, it would 
have given Mrs Scott negligible protection because by the time possession 
proceedings began the two year fixed term had long expired. 
Mrs Scott had, however, been led to believe that she could stay in 23 
Goathland Avenue as long as she wanted. It is not actually possible in law 
to grant a tenancy which cannot be terminated by the landlord so long as 
the tenant wishes to remain in possession, since the Supreme Court has 
affirmed the rule that leases must have a fixed duration.
87
 There are some 
drafting techniques which can avoid this rule, such as granting a lease for 
99 years with a provision allowing notice to be given by the landlord only 
after Mrs Scott‟s death, but of course nothing like this was drafted by 
NEPB.
88
 It is also possible for an agreement intended to create a tenancy 
for an uncertain term which cannot be terminated during the lifetime of 
the tenant to be treated as a lease for life which will be converted 
automatically by statute into a lease for 90 years determinable on the 
death of the tenant,
89
 but again this was inconsistent with the 
documentation drafted by NEPB.  
The promise to allow Mrs Scott to remain in 23 Goathland Avenue for 
as long as she wished could be treated as a contractual licence,
90
 but this 
would be enforceable only between Mrs Scott and NEPB, and would not 
create any interest binding on Southern Pacific. It therefore seems that, 
                                                     
87
 Berrisford v Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd [2011] UKSC 52. 
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 Provision could also be made to allow Mrs Scott‟s son to succeed to the 
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even if Southern Pacific had been fully aware of the circumstances, the 
relatively vague and informal promises to Mrs Scott would have meant 
that only an interest arising by proprietary estoppel could have been 
asserted with any prospect of success. It is unlikely that any lender would 
want to advance funds knowing that it was bound by promises like those 
made to Mrs Scott. Since NEPB required mortgage funding for its model, 
it follows that the deal with NEPB could not have been executed. Absent a 
white knight, the only option left to Mrs Scott would have been to reduce 
substantially the asking price she was seeking for her house, to sell, and to 
move into rented accommodation for which she would have to pay the full 
market rent. She might have had a little more capital (depending upon the 
sale price she was able to obtain), but her overall position would not have 
been vastly different from that she found herself in as a result of the 
failure by NEPB to honour its promises. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
Implications for the future 
 
Lord Collins claimed that the kind of arrangement examined in Scott 
was now relatively rare. He explained that sale and leaseback 
arrangements had become very popular in the early part of the century, 
but they came within the regulatory authority of the Financial Services 
Authority in 2009, and by February 2012 the FSA reported that in practice 
the entire market had shut down.
91
 With respect, while it may indeed be 
true that sale and leaseback arrangements can no longer legitimately be 
marketed, it does not follow that they are not offered illegitimately by 
unscrupulous operators. Ponzi schemes are illegal, but almost every year a 
new example comes to light. Mrs Scott‟s real problem was not that she 
entered into a sale and leaseback scheme, but that she was induced to sell 
her home by promises which could never have been honoured, and which 
were probably never intended to be honoured. She was almost certainly 
the victim of fraud, and fraud is, regrettably, only too common. Lord 
Collins is therefore wrong to dismiss Rosemary Scott‟s case as an isolated 
example which is unlikely again to occur. The implications of the case 
have far wider implications than just for the several score cases which 
were awaiting the outcome of the Supreme Court decision.  
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Magna Carta and the Rule of Law 
 
The primary motivation of the barons when they compelled King John 
to accede to the Great Charter was undoubtedly the protection of their 
own privileges and freedoms. However, Magna Carta has proved to be the 
bedrock on which have been laid those great cornerstones of our 
constitution, the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Freedom 
from the arbitrary or capricious depredations of the Crown – an aspect of 
the rule of law directly traceable to Magna Carta – has given real 
substance to the maxim that an Englishman‟s home is his castle. What the 
North East Property Buyers litigation demonstrates is that this protection 
is not enough to keep a person secure in their own home. The litigation 
shows that the defences of the Englishman‟s castle are not absolute, and 
that the castle walls may come tumbling down from attacks from other 
quarters. The source of that attack may not be obvious. Donald Rumsfeld 
famously said: 
 
“There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. 
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know 
there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown 
unknowns, the ones we don‟t know we don‟t know.”92 
 
Mrs Scott would have known that if she did not pay her mortgage 
before the deal with NEPB, or her rent thereafter, that her home might be 
repossessed. She probably knew that she did not know how she would be 
able to finance her own mortgage if she had been unable to find a buyer 
and the offer from NEPB had not been made. But what she almost 
certainly did not know that she did not know was that the promises which 
NEPB had made were in practice worthless, that it had used a mortgage to 
finance the transaction, and that if it did not keep up the mortgage 
payments her home might be repossessed. 
Tenants know that if they do not pay the rent they are likely to lose 
their home; very few of them will be aware that if their landlord has a 
mortgage which remains unpaid, they may also face repossession. 
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 Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of State, on 12 February, 2002, answering a 
question at a press conference about the evidence showing Iraq‟s possession of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
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The personal impact 
 
Fraud – which was almost certainly involved in this case – has a 
shattering upon its victims. Few are likely to cry for the mortgage 
company, which although impacted, has relatively broad shoulders and 
can amortise the effect of the fraud across other parts of its portfolio. The 
effect upon the householders who have been deluded by unenforceable 
promises is much more stark. Paula Harris, who was the lead solicitor 
acting for the tenants in the North East Property Buyers litigation has said 
of the Supreme Court decision:   
 
“The Judgment is a devastating disappointment for the tenants.... 
The Supreme Court has made it very clear that the tenants are 
innocent victims in this matter, but the current law does not give 
those tenants a right which takes priority over a mortgage 
company. However, the Law Commission is currently consulting 
on reforms which we hope will protect tenants in similar situations 
in future. Sadly, this will not be in time to help those unfortunate, 
innocent tenants of NEPB.”93 
 
                                                     
93
 See http://www.davidgray.co.uk/2014/10/north-east-property-buyers-litigation-
the-supreme-court-gives-judgment/ accessed June 2015. 
